Prospects for a dual inheritance model of emotional evolution by Linquist, Stefan
Prospects for a Dual Inheritance Model of Emotional Evolution
Author(s): Stefan Linquist
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 74, No. 5, Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the
Philosophy of Science Association<break></break>Part I: Contributed
Papers<break></break>Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander (December 2007), pp.
848-859
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/525626 .
Accessed: 19/11/2015 01:46
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 19 Nov 2015 01:46:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Philosophy of Science, 74 (December 2007) pp. 848–859. 0031-8248/2007/7405-0025$10.00
Copyright 2007 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
848
Prospects for a Dual Inheritance Model
of Emotional Evolution
Stefan Linquist†‡
A common objection to adaptationist accounts of human emotions is that they ignore
the influence of culture. If complex emotions like guilt, shame and romantic jealousy
are largely culturally determined, how could they be biological adaptations? Dual
inheritance models of gene/culture coevolution provide a potential answer to this ques-
tion. If complex emotions are developmentally ‘scaffolded’ by norms that are trans-
mitted from parent to offspring with reasonably high fidelity, then these emotions can
evolve to promote individual reproductive interests. This paper draws on case studies
of emotional development to illustrate how complex emotions satisfy these conditions.
Many of the norms and parenting strategies influencing emotional development are
absorbed during the early stages of life when a child is in primary contact with its
parents and before the onset of complex cognition. These conditions make it likely
that emotion-governing norms are transmitted vertically and with relatively little cog-
nitive ‘contamination’.
1. Introduction. The complexity and apparent adaptive utility of many
human emotions have inspired numerous evolutionary hypotheses about
their possible origins and functions. A major stumbling block for these
proposals however is the hard-to-deny fact that emotions are significantly
influenced by culture. How could a trait be both culturally determined
and an adaptation at the same time? Recent developments in evolutionary
theory shed light on this question. In particular, dual inheritance models
of evolution seem well suited to explaining how human emotions might
evolve. In what follows I first outline a basic sketch of dual inheritance
systems, and identify three criticisms that have been raised against the
attempts to explain other (nonemotional) human traits in these terms.
Second, I defend the claim that human emotions satisfy the requirements
for a dual inheritance system by considering two case studies of emotional
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of
Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e-mail: s.linquist@uq.edu.au.
‡Thanks to Mark Colyvan, Paul Griffiths, Alexander Rosenberg, and John Wilkins
for helpful comments on previous drafts.
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development. In the final section I defend this dual inheritance model
against the three aforementioned criticisms.
2. Problems and Promise of Dual Inheritance Models. Dual inheritance
models of evolution have enjoyed a surge in popularity over recent years
(Avital and Jablonka 2000; Sterelny 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2004).
Part of the attraction is their potential to account for the evolution of
such complex human skills as cooperative hunting, tool making, natural
history knowledge, and farming. As Boyd and Richerson argue (2004),
many of these skills are not only highly adaptive, they are too complex
to have been invented de novo or reinvented time and again each gen-
eration. A more likely scenario is that these abilities evolved by a process
of gradual modification and selection. Dual inheritance models offer an
explanation of how such skills might evolve without presupposing that
they are somehow genetically encoded. The key idea is that complex
psychological traits are transmitted from parent to offspring via two par-
allel channels. The computational ‘hardware’ required for social learning
is transmitted genetically and the psychological ‘software’ that supports
a given technology or skill is transmitted culturally. Both modes of in-
heritance are assumed to be relatively high fidelity but also capable of
slight modification over successive generations, as is required for any
cumulative process of evolution. Importantly, according to simple dual
inheritance models the fitness of a coevolved trait is calculated in terms
of the reproductive costs and benefits it bestows on its bearers. A new
hunting strategy evolves in a population because it enables the individuals
who acquire it to obtain more calories and thereby have more (or health-
ier) offspring to whom they can pass that strategy on. This feature dis-
tinguishes dual inheritance models from memetic accounts of cultural
evolution. According to memetic models, the fitness of a psychological
trait is determined largely by its tendency to spread horizontally (like a
virus) from individual to individual regardless of its impact on his or her
biological fitness.
While dual inheritance models have been invoked to explain the ac-
cumulation of adaptive skills and other forms of “cognitive capital,” rel-
atively little has been written on their prospects for explaining the evo-
lution of human emotions. However, many of the complex or “higher
cognitive” emotions (e.g., guilt, jealousy, shame, pride, embarrassment,
and moral disgust) lend themselves to just this sort of framework. As I
shall illustrate below, these emotions develop out of innate reactive dis-
positions that emerge early in life, but which become increasingly cog-
nitively elaborated over the course of an individual’s emotional devel-
opment. This developmental process is governed by social practices (e.g.,
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 19 Nov 2015 01:46:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
850 STEFAN LINQUIST
parenting strategies, childhood myths, and rituals) which are culturally
transmitted and have apparently evolved for this purpose.
The idea that human emotions have been shaped by natural selection
is a popular theme in the writings of many psychologists and biologists,
beginning with Darwin. These proposals often emphasize the adaptive
utility of many human emotions. For example, fear seems well designed
for mobilizing a fight or flight response. Guilt and shame have been
proposed as internal enforcement mechanisms for motivating adherence
to cooperative alliances. Similarly, embarrassment has been suggested as
a social signal of one’s adherence to cooperative norms. Somewhat more
controversially, romantic jealousy has been proposed as a mechanism for
monitoring the status of a sexual pair bond and for motivating defensive
behaviors when it becomes threatened. Despite their appeal as viable
hypotheses, these proposals have run into a theoretical stumbling block.
Most if not all of the emotions just mentioned are under the influence of
culture—they are not ‘innate’ in the traditional sense of being largely
unlearned. This has led several thinkers to reject evolutionary hypotheses
from the outset. Since complex human emotions are not innate, it is
argued, they are just not the right sorts of candidates for an evolutionary
explanation (Prinz 2004). But for reasons that I discuss below, this ar-
gument fails. Dual inheritance models can potentially accommodate the
fact that emotions are culturally influenced while at the same time ex-
plaining how they might have been shaped by natural selection.
However dual inheritance models raise their own set of challenges.
Three criticisms are particularly salient. First, as Kim Sterelny has recently
argued (2003, 2008) the same cognitive abilities that are required for the
acquisition of cultural information are likely to degrade the fidelity of its
transmission. Sterelny points out that imitation learning is required for
an individual to acquire a skill by observing its execution. But the greater
an individual’s capacity for imitation learning, the more prone they will
be to draw on individual experience to modify a task. Moreover, a mimic
will often have only limited exposure to a model, so some inferential
reconstruction of the task will be required (e.g., I know that bow-making
had something to do with heating the branch before bending it, but how
much heat? For how long?). Thus Sterelny argues that “these very abilities
undermine the intergenerational flow of information. For they increase
the extent to which an individual’s beliefs and behaviour are sensitive to
his own experience, and they decrease the extent to which these beliefs
and behaviours are the result of blindly copying those of previous gen-
erations” (2008, 8). Let’s call this the cognitive degradation problem.
Boyd and Richerson attempt to avoid this problem by appealing to the
fact that cultural transmission is often not vertical. Some cultural infor-
mation also flows horizontally (person to person within a generation) and
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obliquely (from individuals in the N generation to nonkin in the N 1
generation). Boyd and Richerson argue that horizontal and oblique trans-
mission can compensate for a loss of fidelity, provided that the right sorts
of cognitive biases are in place. Conformist biases involve the tendency
to adopt the most commonly practiced behavior. Thus, an individual of
the N generation might sample from multiple “cultural parents” and
choose whichever practice is most common. This effectively adds redun-
dancy to a signal thereby making low fidelity traits more likely to be
passed on over successive generations. Content biases motivate an indi-
vidual to choose whichever practice is most successful or the one that
they find particularly appealing. This form of bias effectively enhances
transmission rate by soliciting a high number of mimics. Boyd and Rich-
erson demonstrate mathematically that such biases in the transmission of
cultural information can lead to the accumulation of cognitive capital at
the population level over successive generations. However, horizontal
transmission can also lead to the rapid spread of maladaptive tendencies.
It is psychologically unrealistic to suppose that content biases will always
lead an individual to choose the most adaptive behavior from a range of
alternatives. Some traits will be psychologically appealing but biologically
maladaptive, for example, heroine use and abstinence remain attractive
to some. Thus, dual inheritance systems that are capable of horizontal
and oblique transmission are less likely to support individually adaptive
traits than systems that are exclusively linear and high fidelity. Call this
the maladaptive meme problem.
A further objection to biased transmission models is that they fail to
take into account the biological costs that information transfer imposes
on the model. As Sterelny points out, sharing valuable information with
nonkin of the generation can be costly to a model if those skillsN 1
are used to compete against his or her own offspring. Sterelny argues that
unless group-level selection is acting on a population, it will be disad-
vantageous for models to openly share their precious skills with nonre-
latives. Call this the costly information problem.
My aim in what follows shall be to defend a simple dual inheritance
account of human emotions against the three criticisms just described.
My strategy shall be to first consider two case studies of emotional de-
velopment. These examples provide a vivid picture of the ways that bi-
ological and cultural factors act in concert in the production of an emo-
tional phenotype. The examples also highlight some important differences
between the acquisition of emotional traits and the transmission of the
sorts of complex skills with which dual inheritance theorists are usually
concerned. In particular, I argue that emotional traits are (1) acquired
early in life, prior to the acquisition of sophisticated cognition, (2) influ-
enced primarily by one’s parents and are therefore transmitted linearly,
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(3) scaffolded by cultural practices that are unlikely to be modified in
light of individual experience. Thus, complex human emotions are es-
pecially good candidates for a simple dual inheritance model of their
evolution.
3. Guilt and Metagu: Two Case Studies in Emotional Development. From
an early age children exhibit a range of emotional reactions posited as
the developmental precursors to guilt, shame, embarrassment and other
complex emotions that develop later in life. By age two the perception of
anxiety or distress in others generates a similar state in the observer, which
in turn gives rise to a range of ‘prosocial’ behaviors (e.g., hugs, pats,
kisses) in an apparent attempt to alleviate their shared anxiety. Interest-
ingly, Zahn-Waxler (1992) reports that toddlers’ own state of anxiety as
well as their level of prosociality are influenced by the perception that
they caused another person’s distress, as opposed to having merely ob-
served its incidental occurrence. The fact that even such young toddlers
appear to have a rudimentary sense of responsibility associated with their
own bad feelings and conciliatory gestures makes this early affective dis-
position a good candidate for the developmental precursor to guilt. Of
course, such responses do not qualify as full-blown guilt. Mascolo and
Fischer (1995) note that not until ages three to four are children able to
verbally articulate the link between harmful actions and bad feelings.
Without such foresight, it is unlikely that guilt could play a role in de-
terring a person from engaging in future harmful behaviors. Toddlers also
lack an understanding of the norms specifying the conditions under which
one ought to feel guilty. Bretherton et al. (1986) note that it is not until
at least age five that children fuse their understanding of emotional agency
with an appreciation for social norms and conventions. And only some
time later that they become sufficiently self-aware to anticipate which
behaviors are likely to cause bad feelings in themselves so that they can
be avoided. Thus, guilt appears to follow a multistage developmental
process that starts out with an ‘innate’ sensitivity to the distress of others
and which becomes increasingly cognitively elaborated as the child
matures.
Kochanska (1991) has conducted an elegant study illustrating how dif-
ferent parenting styles influence this developmental process. Toddlers (one
and a half to three years) were first rated for their individual anxiety
levels. In general, some children are born more anxious than others: they
are more reluctant to approach a novel toy or unfamiliar adult, they are
more easily distressed by a loud noise, etc. Kochanska then observed
toddlers interacting with their parents in a naturalistic setting and took
note of two different strategies for dealing with misbehavior. Authori-
tarian parents tend to issue commands or criticisms without providing
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rationalizations—for example, “put that toy back where you found it!”
or “don’t be so naughty!” Perspective-taking parents encourage the child
to consider how their actions impact others—for example, “how do you
think that made Johnny feel?” or “what if that was your toy?” Finally,
Kochanska surveyed the same population of children five to six years
later for their tendency to experience guilt. Interestingly, she discovered
an interaction effect between toddlers’ early anxiety levels and the par-
enting styles they encountered. Low anxiety children displayed an average
level of guilt-proneness regardless of which parenting style they encoun-
tered. However, high anxiety children who encountered the authoritarian
style exhibited lower than average levels of guilt. High anxiety toddlers
who encountered the perspective taking style exhibited higher than av-
erage levels of guilt later in life. One thing that this study makes clear is
that the development of guilt involves more than just the internalization
of norms once one has reached a certain level of cognitive sophistication.
The development of guilt involves both a biological and a cultural con-
tribution, and appears to begin even before children acquire an explicit
sense of agency or can draw a conscious link between their actions and
their future feelings.
Turning to our second example, in her influential ethnography of the
Ifaluk of Micronesia the anthropologist Catherine Lutz describes an emo-
tion—metagu—quite similar to what Westerners would identify as guilt
or shame. Lutz describes metagu as the primary inhibitor of misbehavior
in children and adults. A well-socialized member of Ifaluk society is ex-
pected to experience this emotion in the presence of a respected elder, or
in response to another person’s “justifiable anger.” Lutz explains that,
“Good people on Ifaluk are those who anticipate ‘justifiable anger’ of
others (especially elders), are metagu of their own wrongdoing, and hence
behave in a calm, nonagressive manner” (1983, 253–254). Failing to ex-
hibit this emotion under the appropriate circumstances is unthinkable in
Ifaluk society, thus there is social pressure on parents to instill this emotion
from an early age. Interestingly, Lutz notes that the Ifaluk themselves
view metagu as something that emerges naturally in children, but which
requires careful cultivation though the enforcement of norms and, peri-
odically, through explicit rituals. From the first year of life children are
expected to exhibit metagu in the presence of an adult visitor to the home.
For example, when a visitor enters the house children are expected to
adopt a subordinate posture and to avoid direct contact. Lutz explains
that, “children who do not appear metagu have their attention drawn to
the stranger in an attempt to elicit this emotion” (1983, 254). If this
strategy proves unsuccessful or if children fail to exhibit metagu in other
social settings, parents will resort to the following ritual:
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The most striking way in which metagu is socialized is through the
use of a special type of ghost (tarita) which is said to kidnap and
eat children. This ghost is impersonated by one of the women of the
child’s household, who covers and disguises herself with cloths. The
ghost, which normally resides within the wooded interior of the is-
land, is called by parents to come and take the child if she or he
misbehaves. The ghost is most frequently called if the child has ag-
gressed against a peer, of if the child begins to wander away from
the house. Appearing menacingly at the edge of the house compound,
the ghost causes young children to leap into the arms of any nearby
adult. The label metagu is used in profusion to describe the child’s
reaction, and the ghost is then told by one of the adults present that
“the child will no longer misbehave” and that it should therefore go
away. (1983, 255)
These accounts of the tactics parents employ in scaffolding the devel-
opment of metagu betray a complex interaction between biological and
cultural factors. It is well established that toddlers possess an affective
disposition to become frightened by strangers, often looking to their par-
ents as a “social reference” to determine whether they should approach
or avoid the unfamiliar person. The Ifaluk have apparently adopted cul-
tural practices that harness this aversive tendency in the development of
metagu. As Lutz explains, the child who does not immediately display an
aversive response when a stranger enters the house has their attention
drawn to the visitor in an attempt to elicit this response. If that doesn’t
work, parent’s stage a frightening ritual that effectively enhances the
threatening stimulus (what ethologists would consider a superstimulus)
thereby ensuring that the fear response is engaged. It is also significant
that parents proceed to use the word “metagu” profusely while the child
is recoiling in fear. This practice presumably establishes a direct associ-
ation in the child’s mind between this term and the appropriate aversive
response. Once this association has been established it could facilitate the
further cognitive elaboration of metagu. On future occasions when a child
encounters this term (e.g., while being instructed on how the metagu
individual ought to behave) the mere mention of metagu might trigger a
“somatic marker” (a low-level physiological response) in the subject, lead-
ing her to associate norm violations with a strong, negative emotional
episode (Damasio 1994). Interestingly, Lutz herself offers a similar inter-
pretation of the socialization of metagu: “Adults link the child’s early
developmental avoidance reaction to strangers to other dangerous situ-
ations (such as straying from the household) which the child does not yet
perceive as such” (1983, 257).
However, Lutz goes on to emphasize only the cultural aspects of this
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socialization process. A more accurate model of metagu’s development
ought to recognize the interaction between biological and cultural factors.
Both the innate aversive response to strangers and the social norms and
rituals that exploit this disposition contribute to metagu’s development.
These examples paint a suggestive picture of how complex human emo-
tions might evolve in accordance with a simple dual inheritance model.
Kochanska’s study illustrates that individual genetic differences in tod-
dlers’ anxiety levels impact their susceptibility to different parenting styles.
Assuming that parenting styles are transmitted socially from parent to
offspring, it is easy to imagine how modifications to either the genetically
or the culturally transmitted component of this phenotype might impact
an individual’s fitness. In a socioecological environment that places a
premium on cooperation, for example, guilt prone individuals might enjoy
a selective advantage. This selection pressure could result in an increase
in the frequency of the anxiety-prone genotype, in the perspective taking
parenting style, or both. Similarly, in Ifaluk society an individual who
fails to develop metagu would likely incur a fitness cost associated with
social ostracism, for example, by encountering difficulties in finding a
mate or failing to receive cooperative social benefits. Admittedly, these
“how possibly” scenarios are speculative. A more detailed understanding
of the social and biological implications of individual differences in guilt
and metagu would provide insight into whether these emotions have in
fact undergone evolution by natural selection. However, there is fairly
strong evidence that dually-inherited emotions have evolved in some non-
human animals. Certain artificially selected strains of mice exhibit ex-
tremely high anxiety levels when placed in novel contexts. Cross-fostering
experiments reveal that this emotional disposition is transmitted in part
via a behavioral channel: the biological offspring of low anxiety mice
develop the high anxiety phenotype when reared by high anxiety adults
(Meaney 2001). More detailed studies reveal that whether a rodent de-
velops the high anxiety phenotype depends specifically on the amount of
“anogenital licking” and “arched-back nursing” that it receives from its
mother during the first week of life. These maternal behaviors are socially
acquired and highly heritable. Their occurrence is significantly less com-
mon in low anxiety than in high anxiety strains, yet they can be readily
adopted and passed on by the offspring of low anxiety mice as a result
of cross fostering. Thus, artificial selection for fear in mice appears to
have resulted in the evolution of a maternal ‘parenting style’ that scaffolds
the development of this emotional disposition. In humans, the opportu-
nities for such nongenetic influences on emotional development are even
greater, given our extended period of infant dependency and the degree
to which we are steeped in cultural traditions. It would therefore be sur-
prising if selection had not retained some of our cultural traditions for
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their fitness enhancing influence on emotional development. With this
proposal in mind, let us turn to the three objections (mentioned earlier)
to simple dual inheritance models.
4. How Emotional Traits Differ from Complex Skills. Recall that the cog-
nitive degradation problem arose out of a sort of catch-22: the same
cognitive prerequisites required for imitative learning are likely to degrade
the fidelity with which a trait is culturally transmitted. This occurs, ac-
cording to Sterelny, because sophisticated social learners can be expected
to modify previously acquired skills in light of their individual experiences.
Notice that this argument assumes that the acquisition of the phenotype
in question—a valuable skill—involves a sophisticated learning process.
In this respect emotional development differs from skill acquisition. Emo-
tional development involves no sophisticated learning abilities. Rather,
complex emotions are scaffolded by parenting norms and rituals that exert
their influence long before children have acquired the ability to reflect on
their own experiences. By the time an individual has reached an age of
self-reflection, it will be too late to undue those influences without con-
siderable effort. Therefore, cognitive degradation does not threaten the
transmission of emotional phenotypes.
But perhaps this argument is too quick. What happens when the child
matures and it becomes time for her to scaffold the emotional development
of her own children? Dual inheritance models require that the adult re-
produces the same cultural practices that were influential on her own
development. However, by this time the individual will possess the cog-
nitive resources to reflect on her actions and to modify the relevant par-
enting techniques accordingly. Won’t fidelity be lost?
In considering this objection it is important to become clear on why
Sterelny thinks that cognitive sophistication will lead to degradation in a
cultural tradition. Presumably, in the case of a social skill, modifications
are motivated by feedback: differences in the execution of a skill that
have an identifiable bearing on its outcome will inspire an individual to
make permanent changes. I propose that people are less likely to tinker
with emotion-governing traditions for four closely related reasons. First,
in the case of emotional development there is a significant time delay (a
matter of several years) between the point where a parenting strategy
begins to be employed and the time when it manifests itself in the off-
spring’s emotions. Children begin to encounter a particular parenting style
at infancy, they do not develop full-blown guilt until after age five. With
such a time lag, it will be difficult for an individual to develop hypotheses
about which aspects of a parenting strategy influenced particular aspects
of emotional development. The feedback process is just too slow to be
amenable to trial and error. Second, connections between a parenting
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strategy and its impact on emotional development are often nonrational
and contrary to folk-psychological expectations. Who would have ex-
pected that an authoritarian approach would result in lower than average
guilt levels in anxious children? Surely not the parents who employ it!
Similarly, in the case of rodents the links between parental behaviors and
an offspring’s emotional development are detectable only with careful
experimentation. Nonrational connections between cultural practices and
their developmental outcomes make the parenting process difficult to re-
verse engineer and therefore less likely to be tinkered with. Of course, this
does not mean that some modifications will not occur. Some people will
invent novel ideas about how their children should be raised that will
impact emotional development. But these changes will be effectively ran-
dom, on par with random genetic mutations. Third, as Kochanska’s study
further suggests, the influence of a given parenting style on emotional
development is not uniform across different genotypes. There is therefore
no guarantee that adopting the style of another apparently successful
parent will produce similar results in one’s own offspring. Again, the
existence of such gene/environment interactions might not preclude a par-
ent from occasionally adopting another’s style. However, if horizontally
acquired parenting strategies are rarely successful when applied to ge-
notypes with which they have not coevolved, this could deter the evolution
of a metapractice that encourages such parental borrowing. The fourth
and final reason for expecting parents to be less inclined to tinker with
emotion-norms than with complex skills is that the former are more cul-
turally diffuse than the latter. Hunting, for example, is a relatively discrete
practice with a specific context and duration. By contrast, the norms that
scaffold emotional development are more pervasive: they are embedded
in the stories that we tell our children, in our expressive reactions to their
misdemeanors, and in the explicit rules that we lay down. Modifying such
a pervasive system of norms would require widespread tinkering and
considerable conscious effort. Altering a hunting or farming technique
appears simple by comparison, requiring only the adoption of a new tool
or planting a different crop. Thus, the fact that parental strategies are (a)
temporally distanced from their effects, (b) unpredictable in their out-
comes, (c) variable in their interactions with different genotypes, and (d)
highly culturally diffuse militates against their cognitive degradation.
The maladaptive meme problem also seems less likely to arise in the
case of emotion-governing traditions. Recall that the threat of maladap-
tive cultural traditions spreading viruslike through a population is made
possible by the existence of horizontal and oblique transfer. The more
horizontal and oblique transmission taking place in a system, the greater
the threat. When it comes to cultural traits that require sophisticated
cognition for their acquisition, horizontal transmission seems likely be-
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cause by the time an individual is in a position to acquire them (when he
or she has the requisite motivation, coordination, attention span, etc.) he
will be interacting with numerous adults and peers in the community. By
contrast, emotional dispositions are laid down before most children have
left the home or had much exposure to people besides their parents.
Therefore, emotionally significant traditions will be more likely follow a
vertical (parent to offspring) pattern of inheritance. So long as the trans-
mission process occurs with reasonably high fidelity, emotional traits will
evolve in ways that benefit individual lineages. For similar reasons the
expensive information problem does not arise in the case of emotion-
governing practices. If a parents’ influence is restricted primarily to their
own children, the fitness costs associated with teaching a ‘good idea’ to
a nonkin member do not arise. Nor is it necessary to appeal to group
selection to explain how adaptive emotional traditions evolve.
5. Conclusion. Emotional traits resemble complex skills in their com-
plexity and in their apparent adaptive value. The practices and rituals
that regulate emotional development are unlikely to have sprung de novo
out of the mind of some insightful individual. It is more likely that these
traits evolved over successive generations by a process of gradual selection.
Dual inheritance models provide an explanation of how such culturally
influenced traits might have evolved. Examples of emotional development
reveal that guilt, shame, and probably other complex emotions develop
out of innate dispositions that are cognitively elaborated through their
interaction with culturally sustained practices. Adaptive modifications to
either the genetic or the culturally transmitted component of these com-
plex traits could potentially be favored by natural selection. Emotions are
unlike complex skills, however, in that they are acquired without the use
of imitative learning and when toddlers are interacting primarily with
their parents. Nor will adults be motivated to tinker with the social scaf-
folding apparatus required for the development of an emotion. The sig-
nificant time lag between cultural cause and emotional effect, the non-
rational nature of these developmental systems, their sensitivity to
different genetic backgrounds, and their culturally diffuse nature make
parental practices difficult to reverse engineer. Therefore, the cultural com-
ponent of an emotion should be transmitted primarily vertically with
relatively high fidelity. This is precisely what is required for a dual in-
heritance system to operate effectively.
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